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Spain has a highly partisan media system, with newspapers reaching self-selected partisan 
audiences and espousing explicitly partisan editorial preferences.  Do the newspapers of the left 
and right differ in how they cover politics in ways that can be predicted by their partisan 
leanings?  We review theories of issue-ownership, journalistic standards, and information 
scarcity and test hypotheses derived from each.  We find that the parties converge substantially 
in virtually every aspect of their coverage.  Few differences emerge when we look at what topics 
are covered or in the dynamics of which topics gain attention over time.  However, we confirm 
important differences across the papers when they make explicit reference to individual political 
parties.  Journalistic norms result in a surprising focus on the faults of one’s enemies, however, 
rather than the virtues of one’s allies.  Our assessment is based on a comprehensive database of 
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News Coverage in a Partisan Environment 
Media coverage of politics is a fundamental matter for democracy. Democratic debate and civic 
discourse depend to a large extent on how the media gives access to policy actors to express their 
views and ideas about issues. Political communication scholars stress the privileged position of 
elites, especially governmental actors, in gaining access to the news (Bennett 1990, Iyengar 
2011, Graber 2003).  Journalists report about what political elites are doing or planning to do, 
often ignoring other policy actors who are deemed to be less newsworthy than “officials.” Elite 
status is explained by formal rules governing the political system, but also informal rules more 
related to the seniority of a policy actor or tradition (Walgrave and van Aelst 2008).  In this view 
media coverage is driven by the actions of political elites, real word events, and competition for 
readership, more than partisan logics or journalist preferences. In a different vein, media systems 
scholars stress the importance of political parallelism, journalistic professionalism, state 
regulation and media ownership in how newspapers cover politics (Seymour-Ure 1974, Blumler 
et al. 1992, Hallin and Mancini 2004). Media coverage reflects the preferences and partisan links 
between political parties and individual media outlets, which lead to important inequalities on 
how newspapers cover different parties. Some political elites would have more media coverage 
than others depending on the political orientations and ideological affinities of journalist (van 
Dalen and van Aelst 2013).   It appears that cross-national studies emphasize differences based 
on ownership patterns and the degree of partisan connection in the media system.  We contribute 
to these literatures by focusing on the two main daily newspapers in Spain, a country that has 
strong political parallelism and might be expected to show significant partisan differences in 
media coverage.  In contrast to these expectations, we show that while differences are apparent, 
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they are not as powerful as the similarities. These similarities are well explained by Bennett’s 
indexing theory: Both parties give great deference to “official” sources. 
However, when the two newspapers focus their attention on individual political parties, 
they show their biases.  Rather than vaunt the proposals of their allied party or draw attention to 
the issues thought to be advantageous to them, however, we find that the bias comes in how they 
treat their rival.  Each paper under-emphasizes the role of their allied party and over-plays the 
faults of the rival.  Thus, the left-leaning El País provides much greater coverage of the Popular 
Party (PP), especially when government officials of the PP are involved in corruption scandals.  
In almost perfect parallel, the right-leaning El Mundo provides much less coverage of these 
scandals.  But when a Socialist Party (PSOE) government is beset with similar corruption issues, 
the newspaper with most coverage is, naturally, the rival one.  We therefore identify some 
partisan differences in coverage, but these are decidedly reactive and negative.  With regards to 
parties, they downplay the actions of their allies and focus instead on heaping bad news on the 
rival.  In all, Spain’s two major national dailies have highly similar news agendas.  But when 
they cover the activities of the political parties, all news is bad news. 
The Spanish Media System  
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004) Spain perfectly fits into the so-called polarized pluralist 
media system, characterized by a strong political parallelism, low circulation of newspapers, low 
professionalism, and high state intervention. In contrast to other countries (Seymour-Ure 1974, 
2003), there is a strong link between media groups and political parties, reducing independent 
reporting about political campaigns (Sampedro et al. 2008), the people’s knowledge about 
politics (Fraile 2010), how issues are framed (Baumgartner et al. 2008, Boydstun 2013, 
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Arsenault and Castells 2008, Castells 2009), and more broadly media coverage of politics 
(Seymour-Ure 1974, Tresch 2009). 
In Spain, to read a newspaper is to be associated with an ideological or partisan camp. In 
contrast to other countries (Seymour-Ure 1974, Gunther et al. 1999), this link between media 
groups and ideology is explained by readership patterns, more than ownership or/and the links 
and affiliations of journalists with a political party. Politicization of media outlets and the 
ideological fragmentation of readership have been in place from the transition to democracy to 
present (Gunther et al. 2000). During the late-1970s and 1980s this link was especially strong 
between El País and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), the ABC and conservative 
parties (first Alianza Popular and later Partido Popular), or/and La Vanguardia and 
Convergencia i Unió. The creation of El Mundo in 1989 reinforced the existing ideological 
fragmentation of readers across newspapers. Since its creation, El Mundo prioritized its task as a 
watchdog of Spanish politics, and the PSOE governments of Felipe González, and in less than 
five years it became the second most read newspaper, after El País (Chaqués-Bonafont and 
Baumgartner 2013). From the mid-1990s both El País (Grupo Prisa) and El Mundo (Unidad 
Editorial, RCS) have been the most read quality state-wide newspapers, followed by other 
conservative newspapers like ABC (Vocento), or la Razón (Planeta), and territorially based 
newspapers like El Periodico de Catalunya (Grupo Zeta), La Vanguardia (Grupo Godó) o El 
Correo Vasco (Vocento).  
In the case of La Vanguardia, and to a certain extent El Periódico de Catalunya (Grupo 
Zeta) 1, this association between media and political parties is especially relevant in Catalonia. 
Most of La Vanguardia readers are voters of the center-right (Convergència i Unió - CIU), while 
most of the readers of El Periódico de Catalunya are voters of left Catalan parties, mainly the 
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Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV) and Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). This illustrates another important feature of the Spanish media 
system: the fragmentation of readers across the territory2.  
These general tendencies can be corroborated with survey evidence.  According to the 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas3, in 2009 more than 50% of the readers of El País 
identify themselves at an ideological position between 1 (far left) and 4 on a 10 point index from 
left to right.  Compare this to just 6.8% of the readers of El Mundo (CIS, 2009). By contrast, 
more than 37% of the readers of El Mundo are above 6 in the left-right ideological scale, versus 
9% of the readers of El País. In terms of partisanship, about 30% of citizens that identify 
themselves as PSOE voters and 21% of Izquierda Unida (IU) voters are readers of El País, 
versus only 5% of PP voters. By contrast, about 23% of the readers of El Mundo identify 
themselves as PP voters, versus 4% and 2% of the voters of the PSOE and IU respectively.  
These results are quite similar to those in the mid-1990s (Gunther et al. 1999). However, 
according to Gunther et al. (1999) in 1993 the average reader of El Mundo was placed at 4.6 on 
the left-right continuum and an important part of the far-left voters (mainly IU voters) were 
readers of El Mundo. This should be understood in the political context in the 1990s, 
characterized by the economic crisis and political scandals and corruption associated with the 
PSOE governments of Felipe González.  These included scandals like the Antiterrorism 
Liberation Group (GAL), the  Roldan case (General Director of the Guardia Civil, a paramilitary 
police force) or the Mariano Rubio case (Governor of the Bank of Spain until 1994; for more 
detailed information see Castells 2009, or Villoria 2007, Villoria and Jiménez 2012). As Castells 
(2009) highlights, since its creation in 1989, El Mundo was aimed at scrutinizing political elites, 
focusing on political scandals, and possible government law-breaking. El Mundo defined itself as 
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the watchdog of the Spanish political system, and that captured the attention of some of the 
voters of the left that were critical and disenchanted with the governments of Felipe González 
(PSOE).  
Globalization and increasing market competition did not limit political parallelism and 
ideological fragmentation of Spanish newspapers. In the new millennium, Spanish citizens read 
those newspapers that are closer to their political ideas, and newspapers respond to the 
ideological positions of their readers, reinforcing their perceptions about politics. None of the 
newspapers has abandoned its ideological position in order to capture a broader audience. On the 
contrary, market competition and globalization have reinforced a model of external pluralism in 
which newspapers are more and more controlled by political institutions4. The question is how 
external pluralism affects media coverage of politics. This is an important question in both 
normative and empirical terms. Existing theoretical analysis, from the indexing theory to the 
agenda setting approach, do not take into account media systems characteristics to explain media 
coverage of politics. Actually, the indexing approach was aimed to explain media coverage in the 
US. This is the best example of what Hallin and Mancini (2004) identify as a liberal media 
system, completely at odds with the functioning of the media system in Spain. On the other hand, 
agenda setting scholars provide a framework to better understand how and under which 
circumstances the mass-media and political elites influence each other, taking for granted the fact 
that media systems operate differently across countries, and that some features, like strong 
political parallelism, may have some impact on how newspapers perform their task as agenda 
setters, gate-keepers and watchdogs of the political system.  The next section is aimed to provide 
a detailed discussion about these theoretical approaches, and define the hypothesis that lead the 
empirical analysis.  
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Literature and Expectations  
According to the indexing theory (Bennett 1990) journalists tend to focus on what the 
government is doing giving special place to “official” sources, discounting opinions that are 
marginal or not represented in the halls of government, and giving priority to the routine 
reporting of the actions of government officials.  The media may reflect the debates among 
government officials and their rivals within the political establishment (Entman 2004, 4), but 
coverage is driven by the elites, not the independent judgments of the journalists. There are many 
reasons to expect some aspects of this indexing theory to hold:  the media pays special attention 
to governmental actors because they are a legitimate source of information, fairly easy to access 
and obtain quotations (through press releases or written reports) and relatively inexpensive to 
cover (Castells 2009, Wolfsfeld and Sheafer 2006). This is especially convenient in a context of 
increasing business competition and reduction of market shares, in which most media companies 
have reduced the set of economic and human resources devoted to the direct coverage of news, 
and thus their capacity to independently provide reliable and contrasted information (Curran et 
al. 2011). Hence: 
H1, Government indexing:  Journalists report on the actions of “official” sources, and 
newspapers should therefore give enhanced coverage to government officials, no matter what the 
party in power. 
This first hypothesis implies that the Indexing theory may apply not only in a media 
liberal system like the US, but all types of media systems. Governmental actors and political 
elites occupy a predominant position in any political system, either democratic or not. They are 
the main source of information and thus we expect journalist may follow what the government is 
doing with independence of the levels of media political parallelism, journalist professionalism, 
circulation of newspapers and state intervention. The same applies for a rarely discussed element 
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of Bennett’s theory: its “mainstream government debate” bias.  He writes that the media “tend to 
index the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of 
views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (Bennett 1990, 106).  
Most of time, the media abdicates from the normative mandate of giving voice to the people 
providing independent and plural information, and only occasionally take into account the points 
of view different from the mainstream official view of the government and the most prominent 
political parties.  He suggests that journalists cover “official” beats and therefore index their 
coverage to the actions of government officials.  They also look for response by other 
mainstream political actors outside of government (Kepplinger et al. 1991).  They do not, 
however, look to the fringes of the political system for viewpoints that may be loud and clear to 
those who look but which fall outside of the major political parties.  
In Spain, what this suggests is an extensive focus by the mainstream media on the two 
major political parties, well beyond their importance in the polls.  Since 1996, the PP has 
received between 38 and 45 percent of the popular vote in successive legislative elections, and 
the PSOE 29 to 44; together they have gotten between 84 and 92 percent of the seats. This means 
both PP and PSOE almost monopolize the legislative process and control activities at the 
parliamentarian arena—from 1982 to 2011 only 5% of the parliamentary bills introduced by 
political parties other than the PP or/and the PSOE were passed and about 85% of the oral 
questions in plenary meetings are introduced by these two parties. By the same token, both the 
PP and PSOE monopolize most of the decisions related to institutional appointments and 
representation, such as designation of the members of the Constitutional Court. All of this 
confers on the two main parties an elite status, and news value much higher than any other actor 
in the political system.  
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Other parties, especially the far left (IU) and regional ones powerful in Catalonia (CIU 
and ERC), in the Basque country (mainly Partido Nacionalista Vasco PNV), Galicia (Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego BNG), or the Canary Islands (Coalición Canaria), may be expected to 
receive less than their proportionate share of media coverage. This is particularly the case when 
the party in government has the absolute majority of seats (e.g., during the PP government of 
José Maria Aznar from 2000 to 2004).  By contrast, access of regional political parties to the 
front pages of the most read Spanish newspapers should be larger when they play the role of 
pivot in government formation. This is the case of CIU during the first government of José M. 
Aznar from 1996 to 2000, or ERC, IU-ICV and BNG during the minority governments of José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011). In this political context, regional parties gain “news 
value” and consequently have a higher capacity to get into the news. In short, following from 
Bennett’s indexing theory,  
H2: Reinforcement of the partisan elite: both newspapers will be highly selective in their 
attention to political parties, focusing largely on the two predominant parties. Access to the 
media by smaller and regional parties is lower, and varies across time depending on their “news 
value.” 
Elite status and news value are two of the factors explaining media access. Other factors, 
like the level of conflict related to the message, the novelty of a story, the type of issue or the 
possibilities of dramatization are also important to explain access to the news. Walgrave and van 
Aelts (2006) suggest dependence of the media towards governmental actors is especially 
important for issues like foreign affairs and defense for two main reasons: first, these are 
obtrusive issues for which most journalists may not have direct experience, or the resources to 
gather information directly. Second, these are issues for which the executive has institutional 
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ownership—that is, formal rules guarantee a predominant role of the executive in front of other 
policy actor in the policy-making process (Walgrave et al. 2008, Seymour-Ure 2003).  
As in many other majoritarian democracies, in Spain the Prime Minister occupies a leading role 
in the policy making process, and this is especially the case for foreign and defense policy and 
for questions relating to the European Union; in these areas the Prime Minister’s office 
(Presidente del Gobierno) almost monopolizes the agenda-setting process. The decision to send 
military troops corresponds exclusively to the Prime Minister, which also concentrates all the 
political responsibility and electoral costs associated with that decision. The same occurs in 
relation to EU matters. It is the Prime Minister who leads the process of European integration, 
participates in EU meetings and negotiates vis-à-vis other heads of government important aspects 
of the agenda that will be later implemented at the national level. Once the decision is made at 
the EU level, it is quite difficult, costly and time consuming to amend EU decisions in the 
parliamentary arena. In contrast to other countries, the Spanish government is not obliged to 
explain its negotiation strategies at the EU level, or the financial implications generated by a new 
agreement. MPs have to rely on raw EU-related documents to get most of the information about 
what is going on at the European arena, and have no capacity to impose parliamentary positions 
on the government (e.g., Raunio 2005). Accordingly, most stories about the EU, international 
affairs, or defense will inform about the activities and policy positions of the Prime Minister, and 
thus we expect: 
H3, Government information advantage:  For foreign policy, defense, and EU-related 
issues, governmental information advantage is so great that both newspapers will offer greater 
coverage to government officials in these areas compared to others, no matter the party in power. 
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Variations in media coverage of political parties also depends on the degree of 
controversy or disagreement about various issues.  It is not rewarding in political terms to pay 
attention to issues about which everybody agrees (Green-Pedersen and Stubbager 2011, Thesen 
2013). The general agreement about the benefits of the EU that traditionally has characterized 
Spanish politics prevents political parties from seeking media attention on EU matters. By 
contrast, political parties will seek media attention when they have an alternative and strong 
claim, different from the governmental position on a particular issue (Entman 2004). This is the 
case of the Iraq conflict at the beginning of the new century. The entry into the war of Iraq was 
one of the most controversial decisions taken by the majority government of José Maria Aznar, 
generating an intense and politicized debate in and out of the parliamentary arena. Political 
parties and other policy actors, mainly social movements, gained some media access reflecting 
the opposition to the military intervention in Iraq by most of the Spanish population.  
In short, in a context of agenda scarcity political parties will concentrate their efforts to 
gain access in relation to issues that either have a strong capacity to attack the party in 
government, or reinforce issue-ownership (Thesen 2012, Green-Pedersen 2006; Budge and 
Hofferbert 1990; Klingemann et al. 1994). As rational actors they will devote their attention 
strategically across issues depending on whether the electorate identifies them as capable to give 
an optimal solution, presenting an alternative policy position that challenges governmental 
arguments and ideas.  This means political parties, especially those in opposition, have some 
capacity to select the issues they discuss, picking and choosing the issues on which they seek to 
make media-ready statements and generally avoiding the unpopular ones.  
In contrast, the incumbent party has to inform the public about what is doing or planning 
to do independently of the level of saliency of the issues at hand. Every Friday, after the weekly 
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meeting of the Council of ministers, the executive’s speaker informs the press about the 
decisions taken by the executive, which may include salient issues, but also regulatory changes 
that generate no political debate. Newspapers will report about both, giving more priority to 
highly politicized issues, of course. For salient issues, like same sex marriage, or immigration, 
newspapers inform about the policy position of both government and opposition parties, while in 
the case of non-salient issues—like a new plan to prevent car accidents—newspapers will only 
report about what the government is doing, basically because there are no further reactions by 
other actors. Accordingly,  
H4: Government agenda fragmentation: Media coverage of government activities is more 
fragmented across issues than media coverage of political parties.  
Newspapers contribute to this issue-selection process of their allied political parties. In 
doing so, newspapers will follow the ongoing political debate, highlighting the failures and 
inconsistencies of the opposing party in relation to highly politicized issues, focusing on what is 
wrong, and always giving the bad news (Baumgartner et al. 2011). This does not mean 
newspapers are able simply to focus on the issues they prefer. Newspapers focus on bad news 
reflecting one of its basic functions in a democracy—holding current government elites 
accountable, and thus, informing about negative developments in economic, political and social 
problems (Soroka 2006). Most of the time, as the indexing theory would suggest, newspapers 
inform about the government–opposition game, giving access to both opposition parties (who 
highlight what is wrong in politics) and governmental actors (who highlight good news about 
politics but also are forced to react in front of bad news; Thesen 2013).  
As a result of these dynamics, media attention tends to be highly concentrated on the 
same issues across media outlets and time (Baumgartner and Jones 2005, Boydstun 2013). Based 
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on a large-scale assessment of the content of all stories appearing on the front pages from 1996 
to 2009, Chaqués Bonafont and Baumgartner 2013 demonstrate that El País and El Mundo cover 
the same topic areas, focusing attention equally on certain topics to the detriment of others, with 
substantial “friction” in how they shift attention from topic to topic without much variation 
across time. But occasionally, events give the opportunity to portray a sitting government or/and 
political adversary in an unflattering light.  This is specially the case of political scandals 
involving members of the executive or/and political parties. For these issues we expect that the 
newspaper of the rival ideological camp will give greater attention to political scandals compared 
to the ideologically allied media outlet.  If this argument is correct we should expect:  
H5, Faults of the partisan opponent:  Newspapers will seek to highlight the flaws of their 
partisan rivals by focusing on embarrassing stories relating to their rivals when they are in 
government, such as corruption issues. 
Note that our last hypothesis refers only to bad news and suggests that newspapers may 
systematically contribute to the public perception that politics is inherently corrupt.  If the allied 
paper refuses to cover the topic when an allegation is laid down, but the opposition paper 
enthusiastically attempts to keep the topic on the front pages, the net result may be more 
coverage of bad news than good.  If generalized, this may be a reason for increased levels of 
public distrust of government. 
Finally, we also expect access to the media follows a different logic during routine 
periods as compared to during electoral campaigns (Walgrave and Van Aelts 2006). Before 
elections, political parties become the protagonist of the political debate, searching access to the 
media either to defend their political program, to foster the debate about some issues, or to 
criticize their opponents. They gain “news value” and become an important source of 
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information, supplying journalist with an overwhelming amount of “easy-to-get” news in 
different formats, from public events and ceremonies ending with a photo, to reports and 
briefings about issues, provocative statements, or/and press releases.  
This does not necessary mean that during election time media coverage of politics will be 
fragmented across political parties. On the contrary, authors like Sampedro (2004), Sampedro 
and Seoane Pérez (2008), González (2008), Semetko and Canel (2010) stress the Spanish media 
system is evolving from polarized pluralism to antagonistic bipolarization in which the two main 
state wide political parties dominate the political debate, and this is specially the case during 
political campaigns. In this view, changing market conditions and increasing concentration of 
power in a few media groups have reinforced the politicization of the Spanish media to the extent 
that other political forces different from the PP and PSOE are left to a marginal position in media 
coverage. As a result, we expect: 
H6, Election Effect: For political parties, access to the front pages increases during 
electoral campaigns, while the opposite occurs in the case of the executive.   
H7, Dominant Party Effect:  The PSOE and the PP monopolize coverage during elections 
as compared to other parties. 
Data 
To analyze who gets into the news, and who gets formally identified in a policy debate we take 
into account the content of all the front-page stories of El Mundo and El País, for the period 
1996 to 2011. To do that we rely on the databases of the Spanish policy agendas project 
(www.ub.edu/spanishpolicyagendas) developed following the methodology of the Comparative 
Policy Agendas project (www.comparativeagendas.info).  The database consists of every story 
on the front page of the two papers from January 1, 1996 through December 31, 2011: 50,775 
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stories from El País and 56,540 stories for El Mundo. For each story we have recorded the date 
of publication, title, and the topic of the story which is classified according to 23 major topics 
and 247 subtopics (see table 1 in the annex). Each story has been coded by two different coders 
with a reliability of 93.25 percent at the topic level and 90.35 percent at the subtopic level.  
In order to explain who has access, these databases provide information about the actors 
involved in each story. We gathered information about whether the story mentions members of 
the executive (Prime Minister, Ministries, and/or the Head of the State), members of the Spanish 
parliament; political parties (with and without representation in Parliament); regional political 
elites (the head of the regional government) regional parliaments; and interest organizations 
(interest groups, social movements). From here, we can measure media presence (whether a 
given type of political actor appears in the media) and media prominence (the number of times a 
political actor appears; see Tresch 2009). To measure media prominence of governmental actors 
we take into account any mention to what the executive is doing or planning to do. This category 
includes all stories that directly refer to the Presidente del Gobierno (mentions to José Maria 
Aznar from 1996 to 2004, or José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero from 2004 to 2011), to the executive 
as a whole (like the Council of Ministers) or a Minister. All these political actors were coded 
separately, but for the analysis presented here, we count the prominence of “government actors” 
as the number of stories in which any of these actors was mentioned.  
In the case of political parties, media coverage is measured taking into account all 
mentions of a political party. Each story can refer to more than one political party or/and 
governmental actor. We have also created a dummy variable to capture political actors’ “elite 
status.” When small and regional political parties give stable support to the incumbent 
government we coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. During the PP government of José Maria Aznar 
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(1996-2004), CIU, and CC always gave support to the incumbent party, while the PNV did so 
only from 1996 to 2000. In the case of the PSOE governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, 
the support came from ERC and CC for the whole period (2004-2011). The far left (IU) only 
gave occasional support to the socialist government and this was especially the case from 2004 
to 2008. We excluded from the analysis all stories that only refer to policy actors from abroad.  
We also distinguish between election and routine times. We considered election times to 
start two months previous to the General Elections.  Finally, in order to control for the impact of 
the economic crisis on media coverage of politics we use the indicator “Current Economic 
Situation” developed by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (www.cis.es). This indicator 
is developed from the one of the questions of the monthly barometers (except August, when the 
survey is not conducted): “Referring now to the general economic situation in Spain, how would 
you rate it: very good, good, so-so, bad or very bad?” This indicator is especially useful to assess 
the impact of the economic crisis, mainly because it directly provides information about the 
perceptions of citizens about the economic situation in Spain, which at the same time are highly 
correlated with other economic indicators like unemployment for example, for which there is not 
monthly data available.  It is important to note that while we have coded data at the level of the 
individual story, with over 100,000 stories coded, the analysis we conduct in this paper is about 
trends over time.  To do this, we have aggregated all our data to the monthly level.  Thus, our 
focus is on the percentage of all front-page stories per month in which each type of actor appears.  
(We use percentages rather than counts because the total number of stories per month varies.)   
Results 
Table 1 summarizes media coverage of governmental actors and political parties from 1996 to 
2011. Overall, almost one third of the stories in the front pages of El País and El Mundo directly 
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mention a member of the Spanish government or/and a political party. Governmental actors 
(mentions to the Presidente del Gobierno, individual Ministries or the Executive as a whole) and 
the two large state-wide political parties capture most of media coverage in both newspapers—to 
the relative exclusion of smaller and regional parties. Less than one percent of the stories of El 
País and El Mundo directly mention the far left, Izquierda Unida (IU), and regional political 
parties account for less than two percent of the stories. This is especially the case when the PSOE 
is governing from 2004-2011. The Basque and Catalan parties are newsworthy mostly when 
“relevant” issues are discussed:  regional autonomy issues, or Basque-related terrorism issues, 
and when they are pivotal in government formation.  The far left parties, unrelated to regional 
concerns, receive significantly less coverage proportionately than their results in popular 
elections would suggest they might. Besides, most stories that refer to the far-left also mention 
another political party, especially the PSOE.  Clearly, there is a bias toward the establishment. 
Table 1 about here 
The Spanish executive enjoys a significant advantage in coverage compared to any other 
actor suggesting that Bennett’s (1991) indexing theory is more prominent in explaining these 
trends than any effort by ideologically driven editors to help the party to which they feel greater 
warmth.  Thus, we confirm H1. Also, Table 1 suggests both newspapers are highly selective in 
their attention to political parties, focusing largely on the two predominant parties, and that they 
pay more attention to their ideological opponents, than their allies, no matter which party is 
governing. About 8.8% of the stories of El País refer to the conservative Partido Popular (PP), 
and only 6% to the PSOE, while 11% of the stories of El Mundo refer to the PSOE versus 8% to 
the PP. This is the case for the whole period with some minor exceptions, like El País paying 
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more attention to the PSOE from 2010 during the economic recession, or El Mundo paying 
relative more attention to the PP right after the winning of elections in 1996.  
Further, as stated in hypothesis 2, access to the media varies across time depending on the 
“news value” of political actors. We expect media coverage of political parties increase when 
they are governing (in the case of the PP and PSOE) or giving support to the government, which 
relates to small and regional parties like CIU, PNV, ERC, BNG or IU. Also, hypothesis 7 states 
that access of small and regional parties may decrease during election time compared to state-
wide political parties. To test these hypothesis we defined an OLS regression model in which the 
dependent variable is the percentage of stories in a given month mentioning a particular political 
party, and the independent variables are (1) support for the government (1 when the party is 
governing or giving support to the governing party, and 0 otherwise); (2) elections (1 for the two 
months prior elections and 0 otherwise); and (3) economic crisis (defined as the percentage of 
citizens that consider the economic situation in Spain is good, from the monthly survey data 
described earlier). This economic crisis variable allows us to assess whether the economic crisis 
alters somehow the predicted pattern of polarization and concentration of attention in the Spanish 
media.  The definition of these variables is summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 presents the results. Overall, the explanatory capacity of the model is high and 
significant, and this is especially the case for El Mundo.  The table contains a lot of information, 
as it has separate models for each newspaper, and each political party.  Looking first at the two 
major parties, it is clear that attention increases dramatically to them during elections (where 
their share of attention in front-page stories increases by 3 to 7 percent), and when they are in the 
government.  During good economic times, defined by survey evidence, attention to these parties 
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declines; their actions are more newsworthy during periods of economic crisis.  For the smaller 
parties, results are nuanced:  Giving support to the government typically makes these parties 
more newsworthy, though there are null results for IU and PNV on this matter.   Results indicate 
IU loses media access particularly when it is giving support to the PSOE government of 
Rodriguez Zapatero.  This, however, coincides with a dramatic decrease of the number of seats 
the party controls in the Spanish Parliament (21 in 1996; just two in 2011). Support to the 
governing party is especially important to explain attention to ERC, which increases its news 
value and elite status after 2004 not only because it gives stable support to the Spanish 
government, but also because it increases the number of seats in the Spanish Parliament from 
two to eight, and it is governing in Catalonia in coalition with the PSC and ICV.  The same 
occurs in the case of CIU, which from 1996 to 2004 gives support to the governments of José 
Maria Aznar, and until 2003 is governing under minority in Catalonia. In the case of PNV results 
are only significant in the case of El Mundo, which may be related to the introduction of the Plan 
Ibarreche—a reform of the Basque statute—in 2001.  
Results from Table 3 suggest that media coverage is not only linked to changes in the 
parties’ news value in terms of whether they give support to the incumbent party, but also their 
status as legitimate and important actors in the political debate about issues related to political 
decentralization.  Thus, we can see increases in attention to the regional parties during periods 
surrounding such events as the regional fiscal reform of late nineties promoted by CIU during the 
minority government of José Maria Aznar, the introduction of the Plan Ibarreche by the PNV in 
the early 2000, or the reform of the statute of Catalonia (2004-2008) led by the Catalan coalition 
government (PSC, ERC and ICV). Regional political parties are a legitimized voice in this 
debate, increasing their elite status and newsworthiness.   
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Second, coefficients about the importance of election periods are also positive and 
significant for the case of the PSOE, PP and IU, which indicate that stories mentioning these 
political parties increase during elections in both newspapers. In contrast, in the case of regional 
parties, coefficients are not significant for either of the two newspapers. Access to the front 
pages by the PNV, ERC, or CIU is larger during routine periods than election times in the case of 
El País, and to a lesser extent in El Mundo. In both newspapers, regional political parties get 
access to the front pages in relation to specific issues, mainly terrorism and voting rights for the 
case of the Basques, and political decentralization for the case of Catalans. But during the 
political campaign they are completely overshadowed by state-wide parties.  
This is particularly the case from 2004 general elections. As Figure 1 illustrates, there is 
an increasing bipolarization of the electoral campaigns between the PP and PSOE, which 
corroborates existing analysis about media and elections in Spain (Sampedro 2008, Castells 
2009). El País and El Mundo increasingly concentrate their attention on what their enemies are 
doing, saying or/and planning to do, contributing to the polarization and negative coverage of 
politics. One of the main consequences of this polarization is the decrease of the privileged 
position of governmental actors during electoral campaigns in relation to political parties. As 
Figure 2 illustrates, attention to governmental actors is more relevant during routine periods, 
especially for the case of El País, while the opposite occurs for the case of the PP and PSOE.  
Figure 1 and 2 about here 
Finally, the economic situation is an important factor to explain levels of attention to the 
main and regional parties. The worse the perception of citizens about economic conditions, the 
more attention is paid to the PP and PSOE.  Attention to the PNV and ERC is positively related 
to the state of the economy, on the other hand.  This suggests that during periods of economic 
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crisis, attention shifts to the main parties, reinforcing the polarization of the political debate 
between the two main political forces.  Election periods are also clearly times when the 
newspapers clearly focus their front-page attention on the main parties at the expense of those 
either ideologically at the margins, or focused on regional causes. 
Summing up, these results corroborate existing analysis about who gets in the news.  
Parties dominate the electoral period, of course, but official sources are predominant during other 
periods. Thus we can also confirm hypothesis 6 and 7: Parties are the focus during elections, and 
that focus is highly beneficial to state-wide political parties the dominant party actors. We also 
find support for hypothesis 2: News value, measured here as support to the government, is an 
important factor to explain media coverage of regional parties (though not the far left). From 
here further analysis should test whether these differences in access to the front-pages between 
state-wide and regional parties, and between routine and election times are also present in other 
sections of El País and El Mundo.  
Hypothesis 3 relates to the government’s information advantage.  Figure 3 shows the 
percentage differences of all stories mentioning governmental actors and political parties by 
policy topic, for both papers.  Positive coverage means attention to actors within the federal 
executive branch (e.g., the Prime Minister, a minister, or an agency of government at the national 
level) is larger than attention to political parties as a whole.  As Figure 3 illustrates, government 
advantage is substantial for all issues except for one: Government operations issues, which 
include elections, political parties as organizations, political scandals, regulation of electoral 
campaigns, and relations between the executive and legislative branch.  
Figure 3 about here 
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Political parties also appear more than the government with regards to terrorism and 
voting rights. Both newspapers give substantial access to Basque in relation to ETA (Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna) terrorism, and also in relation to the so-called Ley de Partidos. The parliamentary 
discussion of this law was one of the most controversial and politicized issues of Spanish politics 
of early 2000, generating and intense confrontation between Basque political parties on one side 
and state-wide parties on the other. Once the law passed in 2002, the Supreme Court outlawed 
several Basque political parties—Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok, Basque 
Nationalist Action and the Communist Party of the Basque Lands and others—claiming they 
were giving support to the terrorist group ETA and never rejected violence as a means of 
politics.5  As Figure 2 shows, media coverage of Basque parties is especially large from 2000 to 
2004, and this is related to this Ley de Partidos, and as stated above, to the discussion of the 
2001–2003 Plan Ibarreche concerning the Basque country in the Spanish Parliament.  
For all other issues, governmental actors always get more coverage and this is especially 
the case of foreign affairs, the EU and defense. In the case of El País, mentions to governmental 
actors are 66% higher than the mentions to political parties in relation to foreign affairs, and 45% 
higher in the case of war. Thus, we confirm the information advantage hypothesis (H3), but also 
find that the hypothesis is incomplete.  Government advantage is not limited to foreign and 
defense issues; but includes all issues with the exception of regulation of political campaigns, 
internal organization of parties or specific issues like terrorism or voting rights. 
Our fourth hypothesis relates to issue fragmentation. Our argument holds that media 
coverage of government activities is more fragmented across issues than media coverage of 
political parties mainly because the capacity of parties to select which issues to get involved with 
is larger than that of the government. That is, while parties choose the issues on which they want 
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to be involved, the government must be involved in a wide range of issues, whether it prefers to 
be associated with them or not; therefore its coverage should be more fragmented across issue-
domains. To measure fragmentation we computed Shannon’s H Information Entropy formula.6 It 
is measured by multiplying the proportion of attention a policy actor receives for each issue, by 
the log of that proportion, then taking the negative sum of those products. The higher the score, 
the more fragmented the agenda of a political actor. Figure 4 shows the governmental agenda is 
always more fragmented across issues than the agenda of the PSOE and the PP without much 
variation across time. Actually, in both newspapers, about 60% of the stories referring to 
political parties are related to political campaigns, scandals of corruption and the internal 
organization of parties. This is, most of the time, mentions to the PSOE and PP are not linked 
with the discussion of specific issues, and do not reflect policy positions, but other concerns 
more related with electoral competition and corruption. It is interesting that in both newspapers, 
attention to governmental actors is increasingly concentrated on a few issues. From 2010, 
mentions to governmental actors are more and more related to the evolution of the economy, and 
the economic crisis which clearly reflects the impact of economic recession on politics.   
Figure 4 about here 
Our next hypothesis relates to partisan targeting and bad news.  Here we go further in 
looking not only at which parties are discussed in which newspapers, but we focus specifically 
on the topic of political corruption scandals.  When corruption stories occur, who covers them?  
This allows an additional test of H5, on targeting one’s rival as opposed to one’s ally.  In the 
context of a corruption allegation, the best media defense is often simply to ignore the issue, but 
the best media strategy of attack is to generate higher and higher salience to the issue.  Therefore, 
for this particular type of media coverage, we confirm H5 very strongly.  Figure 5 makes clear 
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that if one seeks news about the corruption scandal of a given official, it is best to read the paper 
ideologically hostile to them. 
Figure 5 about here 
Figures 6 and 7 delve more deeply in these comparisons by looking at a number of 
distinct policy issues:  terrorism, political rights, elections, regions (political decentralization), 
corruption, government justice, civil rights, and the economy.  First for El País and then for El 
Mundo, the figure compares four time periods, showing the relative attention to the PP minus 
that of the PSOE.  Positive numbers therefore represent a higher percentage of total attention to 
the PSOE as compared to the PP.  To confirm H6, therefore, we would expect El País to show 
positive numbers while El Mundo would have negative numbers.  And indeed this is what we 
see, no matter which party is in power.  
Figures 6 and 7 about here 
At first glance, these figures show newspapers are not paying special attention to their 
ideological allies. Neither El País nor El Mundo is reinforcing patterns of ownership of certain 
issues by the two parties. On the contrary, these figures clearly illustrate that both El País and El 
Mundo pay more attention to their enemies than their allies for all issues and across both periods 
of government and opposition, with some minor exceptions, like economic issues. Attention is 
always larger for the case of the PSOE in both newspapers, but this is explained by the economic 
crisis starting in 2007 under the government of JL Rodríguez Zapatero.  
Figures 6 and 7 also illustrate attention to the rival party increases when that party is 
governing. When the PP is governing (1996-2004), El Mundo pays a similar amount of attention 
to both political parties for most issues with the exception of corruption and governmental issues, 
while the opposite occurs during the governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2001). 
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Once the socialists gain office, El Mundo devotes an increasing share of attention to the PSOE, 
attention that in some cases more than doubles the attention to any other policy actor. This trend 
is not so clear for the case of El País. Attention to the PP in El País increases when Jose Maria 
Aznar is governing, but differences are not so intense. These results clearly illustrate both 
newspapers are paying a disproportionate attention to their enemies, and this is the case for all 
issues independently of which political party is considered as better able to deal with a particular 
issue.  These tendencies are reinforced with the rival party is in power. 
Discussion 
We have compared media coverage across more than 15 years of Spanish politics.  Our results 
corroborate Bennett’s indexing theory. The two leading national newspapers clearly exhibit a 
great deal of deference to the sitting Prime Minister, especially in those issue-domains where the 
national executive has an information advantage:  foreign affairs, EU and defense matters.  But 
governmental actors do not dominate media coverage alone; rival parties are also discussed, 
though this attention focuses on the mainstream, not the fringe or smaller parties. Both 
newspapers reinforce the already dominant position of the PSOE and the PP in the Spanish 
political system, relegating to a marginal position to small and regional political parties. We also 
demonstrate access by regional parties varies across time depending on their news value and the 
level of politicization of some issues. CIU, ERC and the PNV get into the front pages when they 
are pivotal in government formation, when they are governing in their territories, and for the 
debate of specific issues, especially those related to political decentralization and in the case of 
the Basques, terrorism and voting rights.7 
Our results also indicate attention to political parties increases during election time, but 
only for state-wide parties. During electoral campaigns, the PSOE, PP and the far left get more 
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media coverage than during routine times, and there is a clear trend towards increasing 
polarization of the electoral campaign around the two main political parties. This gives support 
to existing analysis about the media and electoral campaigns in Spain, and also indicates the 
level of politicization of the Spanish media outlets (Sampedro 2004, Hallin and Mancini 2004). 
Finally, we show that political parallelism is an important element in explaining how newspapers 
cover politics. Journalistic norms, news value, and focusing events cannot explain why for some 
issues, like political scandals, both newspapers present such a different media coverage. Our 
results clearly indicate that where the most important ideological differences emerge, it is in the 
area of covering corruption scandals. Where a government official of the rival ideological camp 
is in the spotlight, attention burns brightly. Where an allied official is targeted, journalists decide 
they can leave this coverage to their rivals.  So, we can confirm that partisanship generally plays 
a surprisingly small role in determining what topics are newsworthy in Spain’s leading 
newspapers, but that when attention focuses on the political parties themselves, all news is bad 
news.  Of course, we measure newspaper coverage only according to the topic considered, and it 
is likely that if one looked more deeply in to the journalistic angles and detailed perspectives 
offered within each story, greater partisan difference would be apparent from what we have 
discovered.  Still, we have demonstrated that there need be no concern that the main Spanish 
newspapers are covering the political world so differently, based on their partisan preferences, 
that they discuss only those topics that are convenient or ideologically acceptable, which is an 
important prerequisite to democratic discourse and civic engagement.  At the same time, we have 
shown important partisan difference with respect to coverage of ideologically distant political 
actors as compared to allies.  Further research on these important topics will certain fill in some 
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Government 6,723 13.2 2,823 3,900 276  
PSOE 5,841 11.5 2,330 3,511 645 1,261 
PP 4,332 8.5 2,013 2,319 612 909 
IU 491 1.0 346 145 86 105 
CIU 604 1.2 343 261 64 109 
PNV 935 1.8 711 224 82 162 
Other Basques 452 0.9 206 246 60 22 
Other parties 378 0.7 134 244 29 91 
El País 
Government 7,400 13.1 3,578 3,822 453 3,531 
PSOE 3,657 6.5 1,698 1,959 618 2,078 
PP 4,980 8.8 2,684 2,296 677 2,484 
IU 519 0.9 310 209 93 206 
 CIU 688 1.2 439 249 81 298 
 PNV 931 1.6 644 287 110 371 
 Other Basques 321 0.6 138 183 53 98 





















Table 2. Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable Description 
Media coverage  The analysis covers six political parties that at some point 
are governing or giving support to the government:  Partido 
Popular (PP), Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), 
Izquierda Unida (IU), Convergència I Unió (CIU), Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), Esquerra Republica de 
Catalunya (ERC). 
 
Therefore we present six models, one for each party.  In 
each case, the dependent variable is simply the percentage 
of all front page stories that mention that party.  Analysis is 
monthly. 
Independent Variables Description 
1. Governing or giving support 
to the government 
1 during those months when the party is governing or giving 
support to the government; 0 otherwise 
2. Elections 1 during the two months before elections; 0 otherwise.  
3. Satisfaction with the 
economy 
The percentage of Spanish citizens that consider the 
economic situation in Spain to be good or very good. This is 
monthly data from the Barometers elaborated every month 
by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. The 
information is directly available at www.cis.es. 
Period 1996 to 2011. The analysis goes from January 1996 to 
November 2011, right after the general elections won by the 
Partido Popular, lead by Mariano Rajoy.   







Table 3. Determinants of Media Coverage for Spanish Political Parties 
  PP PSOE IU CIU PNV ERC 
El Pais Governing 2.043** 1.526** -.094 .678** -.147 8.631*** 
 Elections 6.631***     3.214*** .868** .181 -.600 -2.772 
 Economy -.093** -.047* .016** -.009 .026*** .205*** 
 Constant 16.393*** 8.085*** .222 1.713*** .032 -9.097** 
 F 10.211 16.290 5.424 3.094 8.152 13.721 
 R2 .127 .207 .065 .032 .101 .167 
 Governing .393     3.568*** -912*** .722** .808** 1.231*** 
 Elections 4.944*** 4.718*** 1.884*** .871 .414 .183 
El Mundo Economy -.139*** -159*** .002 -.024* .051*** .031*** 
 Constant 14.000*** 17.371*** 1.342** 2.007*** -.568 -1.451 
 F 20.287 44.677 21.534 3.555 18.493 35.100 
 R2 .235 .408 .245 .039 .216 .350 
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; the dependent variable is the percentage of front 
page stories per month in which the indicated political party appears.  “Governing” is coded 1 
when the party in question is either in the government, or supporting the government in 
Parliament.  “Elections” = 1 during the two months preceding a general election.  “Economy” = 
percent of respondents reporting that the state of the economy is good or very good.  N = 191 
months from 1996 through 2011.   PP: Partido Popular; PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español, IU: Izquierda Unida; CIU: Convergència i Unió, PNV: Partido Nacionalista Vasco, 










Figure 2A. Attention to political parties during political campaigns, El País 
 











Figure 4. Agenda fragmentation across issues by actor, 1996-2011 
A. El País 
 










Figure 6.  Partisan targeting during the PSOE Government 




Figure 7. Partisan targeting during the PP government 
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1 The Grupo Zeta publishes one of the most read sports newspapers in Spain (Sport) and El 
Periodico de Catalunya. There is also a Periódico in Extremadura and Aragón. Together they are 
the third most read quality paper after El País and El Mundo in Spain. Still, most of its readers 
are located in Catalonia, and voters of Catalan political parties (see any of the annual reports of 
the AIMC and the survey number 2920 of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). 
2 In 2011, most of the 68 newspapers in Spain were local newspapers with low circulation 
levels and low quality profiles. Nationwide newspapers are a few, but account for most of the 
readers—El País and El Mundo account for more than 25% of readers nationwide—and 
dominate the political discourse (Berges 2010, Bustamante 2002, de Mateo 2010, McChesney 
2003). Finally, in some regions like Catalonia, Galicia or The Basque Country, regional 
newspapers—like La Vanguardia, la Voz de Galicia or El Diario Vasco—account for an 
important share of the readers, and have an important impact on the political debate.  
 
3 Data on media parallelism is only available in terms of readership. The Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) introduced a specific question in several polls in order to 
capture this link between ideology, political parties and newspapers readers. Here, we provide 
data from two different surveys: studio nº 2920/0 Post-electoral Elecciones Generales 2011, 
(question 25a); and studio nº 2798 Barómetro de abril 2009, (question 13c). In both questions 
respondants were asked about which newspaper they read to get information about politics. Here, 
the ideological scale goes from 1 (far left) to 10 (far right).  
4 Besides from academic research (eg. Sampedro 2009), institutions like Freedom House or 
Journalist without barriers provide data about the erosion of media freedom in Spain.  
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5 The Ley Orgánica 6/2002, de 27 de junio, de Partidos Políticos) also outlawed the Communist 
Party of Spain (Reconstituted) considering that along with GRAPO terrorist was a single 
structure. The law was passed with the agreement of all political parties but the far left (IU-ICV), 
left regional parties including the ERC and BNG, and all Basque parties.  
6 The formula is: Entropy = (p(x)*log(p(x)), where p(x) represents the proportion of stories on an 
issue (there are 23 issues in the Spanish agendas project list of topics; see Appendix A). This was 
originally developed in the field of thermodynamics to measure the diffusion of heat, but it has 
been later adapted to political science and social sciences in general to analyze scope (see 
Baumgartner et al. 2008, Boydstun 2013).  Economists use similar measures to analyze the 
concentration of firms in an industry: High entropy would refer to great competition, whereas 
low entropy would mean one firm monopolizes or dominates an industry. 
7 Our focus on front-page news stories may limit our ability to speak generally about small 
parties in the media.  It is possible that such parties are more often covered in the inside pages of 
the nation’s leading newspapers.  Still, the front pages are important indicators of public 
discussion and while it would be of great interest to know if the results might differ when 
including inside-page articles, the degree of advantage to the larger parties on the front pages is 
clearly an important element of the Spanish media system, and likely in others as well. 
